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RECOMMENDED ARMY CHIEFS IN THE PROPOS D ESC DIR OTIV

June 15, 1948

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1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It is therefore seems desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the overall control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace:

~~a. Covert operations and planning and preparation for the conduct of such operations in time of war or national emergency shall be conducted by a new Office of Special Projects to be created within the Central Intelligence Agency.~~

a. A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency, and under the policy guidance of an Operations Advisory Committee to be established, shall plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.

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By the National Security Council  
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b. A highly qualified person nominated by Secretary of State and acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special projects.

c. The head of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence ~~for~~. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, ~~under conditions of peace and war~~, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency

d. There shall be established an Operations Advisory Committee composed of one representative of the Secretary of State and one representative of the Secretary of Defense. These representatives shall be provided assistants and staffs as necessary by their respective Secretaries. The functions of this Committee shall be:

(1) To furnish authoritative policy guidance on covert operations to the Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) To assist in the preparation of all plans for such operations. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and a member of the Operations Advisory Committee over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision, except that disagreement on plans for wartime operations shall be resolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when military plans or operations are affected thereby.

e. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

(1) Ensuring through the Operations Advisory Committee that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities, and that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of

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a representative of acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by  
latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime  
military operations.

(2) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad, (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), are ~~kept informed~~ of such operations which as will ~~directly~~ affect them.

f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.

4. ~~In time of war or when the President directs, covert operations shall be conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under appropriate organizational arrangements to be recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the National Security Council.~~

4. Covert operations, in time of war or emergency when the President directs, shall be conducted under appropriate arrangements to be recommended by the Office of Special Projects in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of and approved by the National Security Council.

5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by the Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-

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sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.

6. This Directive supersedes the directive contained in USC 4-A, which is hereby cancelled.

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5. The NSCIBs which pertain to the production of national intelligence should be interpreted in accordance with the following principles:

a. "National intelligence" is a special type of intelligence normally characterized by being interdepartmental in substance, i.e., it constitutes a blend of departmental intelligence views on a given subject, each such view being an intelligence presentation of the factors bearing on the subject which fall within the designated field of dominant interest of the particular department. This is not to say that there may not be rare occasions when departmental intelligence as defined takes on the characteristics of "national intelligence". The criteria for such occasions are not that the subject is important or that it is of interest to more than one department or that a report is requested of CIA; the criterion for such an exception is that the intelligence is to be used as the basis of broad national, as distinct from departmental, policy or decision. Prior to such use, departmental intelligence estimates should be subjected to scrutiny in the light of all available related intelligence in an analytical, objective atmosphere free from possible operational interests or pressures, and should thus be authenticated as a special form of "national intelligence".

b. The "production" of national intelligence is an interdepartmental undertaking, under the leadership of CIA, characterized by a cooperative process of preparation which normally involves a synthesizing of specially prepared contributions from two or more departmental intelligence agencies. Such production is rarely unilateral, for its object is

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to ensure that the national intelligence product has, during all phases of its construction, the benefit of the information and interpretation of the specialized departmental agencies.

g. Such a process of preparation does not diminish the responsibility of CIA for production of national intelligence, since, in case of substantive disagreement, the text favored by CIA is always the main text of the estimate.

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